A Take On Stress- A Junior Leaders Opinion

:- Major Varun Bhasin

The most earnest gratification of being in command comes by commanding troops in arduous and boisterous situations and places. As much as, such an opportunity is professionally satisfying, it demands the same amount of maturity and persistent indulgence, which can be quite draining and exhausting. The environment in the army has changed drastically over the last decade, In terms of external and political situations as well as internal environment. The aim of this brief write up is to give a holistic and pragmatic view of the internal changes seen from a junior leaders perspective, maybe not fully evolved and feverish and inexperienced but deeply concerned, observational and feverous. The internal situation in the army has not only become averse to any kind of mistakes but the patience and vitality that was earlier bred in junior leaders has been replaced with painstakingly high level of intolerance. The godly aura, undeterred focus and determination of the junior command was seen in its best form during the kargil war. That was the time when, having no other choice, the higher brass, enthused complete and unadulterated trust in the junior command. This, however, has now shifted to other areas. The shift in focus has started to take its toll on the fragile and moldable minds of the Indian soldiers and officers.

Stress is a word that haunts the nightmares of every commander, be it a pl cdr, commanding a handful of available boys at a secluded post in the middle of nowhere or a commanding officer, commanding a bn in the heart of Mumbai. The word has a deep and severe existence; it has existed within the system for generations and has raised its ugly head repeatedly. However, in recent times the word “stress” has come to command more attention than ever before. There are innumerable facets that define the analogy of stress and well it does not need the coy cdr to be a Sigmund Freud reincarnation to identify and eliminate these elements. All it needs is a little bit of time and a sincere and selfless understanding of the soldier’s HUMANE side.

Today, we have come to a stage where it needs a suicide or a fratricide incident to suddenly wake up to the symptoms that lead to the unfortunate loss of human life by the demon of “stress”. Then begins the agonizing and exasperating process of question and counter questions. The law books that define the ethos of the army miserably overlook the minor needs of a jawan and the logic of simple instructions. Therefore, what is it that a commander at my level needs to do to obliterate the possibility of “stress” before it becomes a goliath and leads to disgrace the reverence of the defense forces? The answer is, “nothing at all”. Although it may sound astoundingly revolting to the ears of a staff officer in the brigade or higher up, but it is true. A commander at my level has to do nothing. Nothing beyond the nature of a human or an educated individual, with a sane mind. I have, as per my understanding and petite amount of experience, broken down the process of “stress” regulation by a young officer into the following steps:-

1. Gradual and firm entrenchment into the command structure.

It is but a very human propensity to declare ones rise to power, in the shortest time frame, to avoid being rejected or opposed. The ego of a young officer just entrusted with the independent command of a company compels him to do just the same. This is the first crack in the structure. On the contrary, this is exactly what is to be refrained from. The declaration of authority should be the last step of the process of taking over or if I may say, it should not even be intended. The troops, who have been there will over a period, begin to feel the urge of the officer to embed his authority, as an invasion into their peaceful state of mind or well, their plans.

It is extremely important to understand the body of troops as a whole. One need not be told how a certain clan behaves, when together. The commander has to understand the temperament of the Sikhs and Gurkhas, know in depth how thambi’s behave and react and what is to be kept in mind when dealing with Jat’s.

If possible, the first impression that a coy cdr should endeavor to establish is, “I am one of you and am here to add to your strength and vigor. I will lead to only when you feel the need to be lead or when it requires one of us to step up. I am not here to guide you at every step or show you the light of righteousness, but instead I am here to sweat and laugh with you.” The body of troops who have been placed under the command of a YO, mostly are either seasoned, after having survived the same condition for long, which is so far alien to the officer, or, have learnt the art of rejecting the influx of yet another commander. Just like a human body rejects the insertion of a needle, by reacting in the form of pain. The aim here should be to avoid becoming that needle. The process is slow but if well played, yields long term benefits, both for the troops and the officer. Contain the ego and open the vents, which repulse us to become one of our men. We as officers need to have a porous persona, through which the soldiers, who come from humble and orthodox backgrounds, can look beyond the wall made by the glitter of rank and stature of authority.

2. Systematic identification of the individuals under command.

We all have a predisposed mind, to accept in letter and spirit, the impression of our predecessors about the body of troops being placed under command. Although we fail to realize that, the failure of command is not the same as, commanding a failure. It is but a very personnel collapse of one’s ability to enthuse discipline. Thus, have an open mind and an accommodating demeanor. I have seen, over my last six years of minimal exposure, that very few subunit commanders even make the slightest endeavor to rectify a tarnished image of an individual. If one has been said to be a perpetual defaulter by the predecessor, continues to be considered as one for generations ahead. Thus, finally the person himself accepts his downfall and poignantly acknowledges his worldly diminished image and ceases all efforts to improve. I during my process of taking over my company was told of one such NCO, I can proudly acclaim that he is one of the most efficient quartermasters I have ever had.

Identify not the people who are weak or pliable, but the ones who are suppressive and have a revolution brewing inside. These are the ones who are the catalysts of doubt in the weak minds, they are the ones who question logic and defy the authority of the commander. There will be individuals who will almost immediately overshadow the ones who are diffident and in the background. It is pertinent to separate the two classes. It is not always the weak who become stressed and take painful measures to release themselves, but also individuals who we consider strong take such a course if not handled with tact. The point here is to break away from the contemporary teaching of “being a leader”. Stress often brews in the minds of the individual who is denied a desire, irrespective of his mental structure. A desire maybe anything from leave to an appointment or a responsibility or trust or the chance to rectify his fallen image. Open the windows of the minds of the individuals by being forthcoming in such a manner that even if insulted, his ego is intact. I remember my father had established and entrenched himself so well in his command that, even if he slapped a jawan for some unacceptable act, the individual would consider himself punished and feel awfully apologetic. Not only, did he not crib about my father’s ways, but also thanked him for setting him on course and not endorsing his mistake as his second nature. Although commanders today will suitably reject this practice by a painful cliché, “this can’t work with today’s troops”. I would say, rubbish, everything is the same today, only the officer cadre and become over cautious, disregarding and efficient escape artists, escaping the agony of entering the jawan’s mind, by finding replacements. In no way am I suggesting manhandling of troops but instead propagating an idea, where it becomes pertinent for one to have firmly established himself to be accepted by all in any form.

3. ……….“Where the mind is without fear”.

Leave is the word, which moves the army these days. If looked at microscopically, it is one of the paramount raison d'être, which has lead to most of the suicides and fratricides over the last decade or so. Commanders at a subunit level are so wary of questioning a seemingly logical order of “NO LEAVE” that they push the jawan into a mental frenzy and thus stress. All the logics are understandable, dearth of resources, overstretched responsibilities, everything is understood, but still one needs to introspect if these logics are the eleventh commandment of god. Work will suffer with incompetence and ill planning, not by denying the jawan of their basic right. Plan the leave and deny only under severe and extremely dire circumstances. In addition, what we all forget is to explain to the jawan, why has he been devoid of this pleasure for now. The foremost fear that essentially governs all actions in one’s mind is the fear of “denial of leave on time or as planned”. Thus comes the agony of having to face lies and “family problems”. Eradication of this fear will iron out most of the other grey areas. If well articulated, it will reduce the creeping urge to lie and will enable the individual to concentrate on more important responsibilities rather than plan an escape. The aim here is to create an enviournment, which is conducive for any kind of a task, irrespective of its nature of difficulty. This will not happen overnight, but will sprout fruits of success only when the mind of the most insignificant soldier under command is assured without doubt, that no matter what; his leave will be looked after. This fear should come enveloped with a sense of belongingness for his company; this again is the responsibility of the coy cdr or junior leader.

In no way, should being approachable be mistaken as being by passable. Excess of everything is harmful. It is as important to know when to stop being concerned for the welfare and wellbeing of troops, as it is to know when and how much welfare is needed. One needs a gradual and systematic plan for welfare, as this is one aspect, which may lead to disastrous situations if overdone even one notch more than required.

4. Train and Trust

The mammoth organization or rather the family that is army is the only self-sustaining Inc. in the country, which can continue to run and grow at a steady pace undeterred and unhindered by the ever-diminishing economic situation outside. This has been made possible, well, by a firmly entrenched belief in oneself and of course generations of being impervious to accept dilution of faith and trust. Again, sadly due to the systematic and gradual dilution of the army’s image by an overtly obsessive media and a partially informed society, the very roots of trust have been tarnished and tormented, even at a very micro level. The NCO who has been an exceptional asset to the org all his life becomes an extremely incompetent JCO, only because the coy cdr has refused to accept him as an asset, as he is being over cautious of every minute detail and obsessive with being morally and militarily correct at all times. This leads to the indl to exercise his lost authority on weak minds in the company. Thus the link between the troops and the officers break.

In the heat of the pressure to generate results, urge to ooze out 9 point ACRs and being on the happy side of the bosses, we as junior leaders forget that the troops are not trained in the regimental centers, but their training begin when they step into our command. If we have spent our valuable time and energy to train them, then what is it that keeps us from believing in our own men who have been molded by our own programs and training designs? It has been a timeless fact that a well-motivated and trained NCO is capable of performing exceptionally better than a used and exhausted JCO. This does not in any way suggests that the JCO is an undesirable entity, however, the sole aim should not be to have scapegoats in precarious situations. The aim should be to have sufficient strength and character to be able to trust anyone, who is well trained and motivated, irrespective of his rank and social stature.

5. The bitter fact and the character to embrace failures.

When a child fails to pass the tenth grade and commits suicide, it is not the mother who is blamed to have pushed the child to take such a drastic step. It is the entire society who has been instrumental in creating such arduous situations and fears, which force the subtle and innocent mind of a child, to take such a step. So why are we so impervious to this fact? A soldier, who kills himself in a fit of rage or under extremely dire circumstances, maybe due to irrevocable situation at home, does so without prior warning. The signs of such stress are not only difficult to identify but almost impossible to distinguish and eradicate. So now, it becomes even more prudent for us to accept such failures, as and when they occur. It is not that the coy cdr has been sitting pretty and totally blinded of the facts in his command. It is the air of the entire organization, which has created weaker minds. The strength in character and conviction of the junior leader disseminates assurance to the troops. A body of troops is capable of doing wonders only, if they trust the command of being by their side in times, when success is easy and even more when things go wrong, and things will most certainly go wrong. Recently a kote NCO killed himself in the fear of a court martial, when he lost a pistol. Let us ask ourselves what was the greater loss, the pistol or the life?

In a jungle, in the wee hours of a freezing and misty morning, where visibility was not more than a few feet. A solider came under fire from the militants. The soldier retaliated and in the heart of a diminishing and precarious situation shot a teenager carrying the stores of the militants. The jawan in the fear of the bosses killed himself later. Was this an acceptable loss? Can we blame the jawan or the team commander?

There are many such questions, that we need to address. Many deceased generals have said many wonderful lines about efficient command, which all tigers conceitedly flaunt in their offices. Sadly these lines today are nothing more that the portrait of Mahatma Gandhi hanging in a corrupt minister’s office piteously gathering dust and disinterested glances.